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Abstract 
This study investigates the effect of the quality of internal corporate governance mechanisms and 
investor confidence. Various efforts for corporate governance reform have been conducted in order to 
enhance investor confidence. Previous evidences showed that investors do not always concern with 
information disclosure about internal corporate governance mechanisms. As such this study attempted to 
investigate the linkage between information about four attributes reflecting the quality of internal 
corporate governance mechanisms and investor confidence. Based on 227 Sharia compliant companies 
included in List of Sharia Securities (Daftar Efek Syariah/DES) in Indonesia, this study found that firms 
size has significant influence on investor confidence. Meanwhile, the quality of internal corporate 
governance mechanism has also significant effect on investor confidence but with different direction. 
Board Structure and Board Composition as two out of four attributes for the quality of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms  were  positively  related,  while  the  other  two  attributes that are Board 
Process and Board Characteristics were negatively related to investors’ confidence. This evidence 
implied that the quality of internal corporate governance mechanisms have some influence on investors’ 
confidence. 
 
Keywords: Investors’ Confidence; Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms; Attributes; List of Sharia 
Securities (DES), Sharia compliant companies 
 
INTRODUCTION (Capital Letter, Arial, Font size 10) 
 
 Recently, most investors are requiring practically perfect information to analyze good corporate 
governance (GCG) in addition to the performance of companies in generating revenue. Good corporate 
governance GCG is perceived to have an important role as a basic mechanism to manage and run the 
company in a way by which shareholders' interests are a top priority of the company's goals including 
maximizing profit and cash flow of the company. 
 
 In the context of Sharia compliant companies especially for Sharia compliant companies listed in 
stock exchange, GCG disclosure is needed for assuring investors that the Sharia compliant companies 
has used appropriate mechanisms to  monitor and evaluate Shariah compliance rely essentially on 
arrangements internal to the firm. Boards of directors as a tool of internal corporate governance 
mechanism should disclose information about their activities in monitoring and evaluating corporate 
Sharia compliance’s activities. This information is expected to be able to boost investors’ confidence. 
However, in the term of listed Sharia compliant companies, recently, information about internal corporate 
governance mechanisms disclosed by the Sharia compliant companies are still not showing the acts of 
Boards of director as a tool of internal corporate governance mechanism in monitoring and evaluating 
compliant activities of Sharia compliant companies. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine 
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 Previous literatures showed that effective boards of director reflect their success as representative 
of investors/shareholders (Mak & Li, 2001) functioning to monitor and evaluate the suitability of 
managers’ decisions and actions with the interests of shareholders/investors (Pascual & Larraza-Kintana, 
2003) leading to enhance corporate performance (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Nevertheless, other empirical   
evidences   showed   that   investors   do   not   always   concern   with information related to the 
effectiveness of boards of director (Conyon & Peck,1998; Mak & Li, 2001; Uadiale, 2010). They 
suggested that internal corporate governance mechanisms still required further investigation to find 
attributes that boost investor confidence. This is especially true in Indonesian countries that have poor 
internal corporate governance disclosure (ADB, 2014). The level of good corporate governance of 
Indonesian country is still in the second lowest level compared to corporate governance of other ASEAN 
countries.  Therefore, this study attempts to find out how attributes of quality of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms influence investor confidence. 
 This study chose Indonesian Sharia-compliant companies as the unit of analysis. There are several 
issues underlying the choice for studying Sharia compliant companies in Indonesia. Firstly, Indonesian 
Sharia-compliant companies experience faster growth rather than non-Sharia-compliant companies, but 
the market share of Sharia-compliant companies  are  still  covered  1  percent  of  the  potential  
market  in Indonesia (sindonews.com, 2011). Hence, Sharia-compliant companies face challenges to 
increase their market share. Secondly, Indonesian Sharia-compl iant  companies should have better 
internal control mechanisms than any other companies have due to the companies’ fiduciary for 
complying with the requirement for being Sharia compliant companies. Thirdly, even though there are 
numerous numbers of literature related to internal corporate governance mechanisms for Sharia-
compliant companies, the literatures were focused on developing conceptual models (Grais & 
Pellegrini, 2006),  and  identifying  the  fundamental  principles  controlling  the  actions  of Sharia-
compliant companies (Mizushima & Mizushima, 2014). Likewise, empirical evidences investigating 
Indonesian Sharia compliant companies are available, but they are mainly focused on investigating 
financial performance of Sharia-compliant companies (Setiawan & Oktariza, 2013) and the influence of 
internal corporate governance mechanism on the  effectiveness  of  corporate  actions  (Haniffa  &  
Cooke,  2002).  Whereas, studies investigating the effect of quality of internal corporate mechanisms of 
Sharia compliant companies toward investor confidence are still in limited numbers.  Therefore, this study 
attempts to find out how attributes of quality of internal corporate governance mechanisms influence 





 One of the critical attributes of listed company is good corporate governance. Listed companies 
with good corporate governance were expected to be  able  to  be  a  reflection  of  efficiency,  
transparency,  and  reliability  of management systems (Corporate Governance Center, 2006). Good 
internal corporate governance mechanisms are expected to be a good signal for reducing investors’ 
uncertainty/risk in their investment (La Porta et al., 2000). Hence, listed companies with good corporate 
governance are expected to create trust and confidence among shareholders and other related parties. 
 Internal corporate governance mechanisms are commonly connected with Boards of Directors, 
because the quality of corporate control highly depends on the effectiveness of Boards of Directors’ 
activities. A number of scholars documented  the  important  role  of  Boards  of  director  in  reducing  
financial restatement (Abbott, Parker and Peters, 2004), reducing information asymmetry between 
management of company and shareholders by increasing the quality of financial  disclosure  
(Karamanou  &  Vafeas,  2005),  reducing  agency  conflict (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Also, Boards of 
Directors functioned as the means for driving internal control mechanisms to mitigate agency 
problems (Dwivedi & Jain, 2005), for monitoring and evaluating the suitability of managers’ decisions 
and actions with the interests of stockholders (Pascual & Larraza-Kintana, 2003; Rosenstein &Wyatt, 
1997; Kim & Purnanandam, 2009; Huang, Chan, Huang, & Chang, 2011; Suvankulov & Ogucu, 2012), 
and for protecting investors’ wealth and  investors’ interest  from  corporate management’s  
expropriation  (Jensen  & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Hence, Boards of director can serve to 
bridge the gap between investors and companies’ management. 
 Moreover,  effective  Boards  of  director  are  also  a  major  determinant affecting investors' 
behavior in capital markets (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1997; Kim &  Purnanandam,  2009;  Huang  et  al.,  
eISBN 978-967-0910-76-5 1592
Conference on Business Management 2017 
School of Business Management, UniversitiUtara Malaysia, 06010Sintok, Kedah, Malaysia,  
 
2011;  Suvankulov  &  Ogucu,  2012). Likewise, agency theory literatures  suggested that efforts to 
increase investor confidence should focus on attributing effective Boards of director as one of the 
primary solutions to protect shareholders’ interest from the opportunistic behavior of management 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, Boards of director is deemed to function as a reflection of real 
internal corporate governance mechanisms (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
 Boards of Director can be divided into four categories (Zahra and Pearce,1989), namely Board 
Process, Board Structure, Board Composition, and Board Characteristics. Board Process refers to the 
activities and styles of Boards of the Director in decision making related to conducting their duties as a 
representative of investors. Effective Board Process determines a success of Boards' functions. Board 
Structure denotes Boards’ organization division of labor among standing committees, and the efficiency 
of its operation. Board Composition refers to the size of Boards and different types of the Boards. 
Meanwhile, Boards Characteristics refer to Boards’ experience, functional background, independence, 
stock ownership, similar variables affecting directors’ interest in and performance their tasks. 
 
Board Process and Investor Confidence 
 The effectiveness of Board Process should be a measure of Board activity (Brick & Chidambaram, 
2010) to undertake strategic controls and fiduciary duty towards stockholders. Board Process can be an 
attribute that has a direct effect on Board performance and  helps investors  for assessing Board 
effectiveness and ensuring that investor interests have been protected (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Several 
empirical studies confirmed that the level of Board activity has a critical role in operational activity of a 
company leading to change its operating performance (Vafeas, 1999) and positively affects firm value 
(Kula & Tatoglu, 2006; Brick & Chidambaram, 2010). As a result, information about the quality of Board 
Process should be interpreted as positive attributes to increase investor confidence in investment 
decision making. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is built as: 
 
H1: The quality of Board Process is related to investor confidence 
 
Board Structure and Investor Confidence 
 Previous   scholars   has   demonstrated   empirical   evidence   that   Board Structure could 
enhance monitoring management and accounting transparency (Leuz,  Nanda,  and  Wwysocki,  
2003),  mitigated  the  variability  of  annual accounting return on assets, accounting accruals, 
extraordinary items R&D expense, the level of R&D expenditures, and reduced information asymmetry 
(Chung, Elder, & Kim, 2010). 
 Considering the important role of Board Structure, other scholars showed that   Board   Structure   
functions   as   a   driver   to   generate   higher   corporate performance (e.g., Kula & Tatogulu, 2006; 
Uadiale, 2010). The significant effect of Board Structure in determining corporate performance leads 
investors to be more appreciative to companies with better Board Structure (Bhana, 2010) and more 
interested in investing their funds in companies with better Board Structure (Carson,  2002).  Other  
scholar  confirmed  that  stronger  Board  Structure  could attract more investors (Chung & Zhang, 2011). 
Therefore, this study posits the following hypothesis. 
 
H2: The quality of Board Structure is related to investor confidence 
 
Board Composition and Investor Confidence 
 Board Composition is perceived as a reflection of objective (Weisbach,1988) and  effective  
control  mechanisms  due to  their desire to  maintain  their reputation (Fama & Jensen, 1983, Conyon 
& Peck, 1998; Ponnu, 2008). Other scholars also documented that Board Structure represented by 
independent Boards are supposed to  balance control  power (Conyon & Peck,  1998) and  enhance 
corporate compliance with corporate governance standard (Ponnu, 2008). Likewise, several evidences 
showed positive linkages between some Boards’ members and firm valuation (Mak & Li, 2001; Darmadi, 
2011). The significant linkages between Board Composition and corporate performance should be able 
to encourage investors to attribute Board Composition as a reflection of good internal control mechanisms. 
Consequently, market responded information about Board Composition positively (Hermalin & Weisbach, 
1988). Given that matter, the subsequent hypothesis 3 is proposed. 
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H3: The quality of Board Composition is related to investor confidence 
 
Board Characteristic and Investor Confidence 
 Board Characteristic reflects the quality of Board attitude and experience and its function as a 
critical device or mechanisms device to assess Boards’s attitude in taking the risk (Sung and Hanna, 
1996) and to monitor and advise companies’ management  to  manage  business  affairs  that  satisfy 
shareholders’ interest (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Additionally, Rivas, Hamori, & Mayo (2009) justified that 
firm with Board Characteristic (represented by Board age) is related to the capability to build firm 
internationalization. 
 Other attribute of Board Characteristic such as corporate ownership held by Boards of director and 
corporate managers is a critical device for increasing operating performance and determining the 
possibility of disciplinary management turnover (Bhagat & Bolton, 2006), reducing the possibility of 
hostile takeover (Shivdasani, 1993), and enhancing the involvement of Board members to perform 
strategic control (Johnson, Hoskisson & Hitt, 1993). Other evidence showed that Board Characteristic 
represented by Boards of a director with additional directorship is considered to have greater experience, 
expertise, and competence to maintain higher governance quality (Vafeas, 2003), which ultimately can 
provide better decision-making performance. 
Prior evidences showed that market responded positively on proxies of quality of Board Characteristic 
such as Board age (Francis, Hasan, & Wu, 2012), the announcement of short-term executive 
compensation plan adoption (Tehranian and Waegelein, 1985), outside directors with multiple 
directorship (Ferris, Jagannathan, & Pritchard, 2003), and the proportion of insider ownership (Chun, 
Stuart, Nanda, & Wallace, 1992). In light of the above argument, the succeeding final hypothesis is 
postulated. 
 
H4: The quality of Board Characteristic is related to investor confidence 
 
Firm Size  
 Firm size is regarded as one variable taken into account by investors in investment decision-making 
process (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Javed & Iqbal, 2007; Barontini & Bozzi, 2009; 
Entwistle et al., 2012). The present study uses log natural of total asset as have been conducted by 
previous studies (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Entwistle,et al., 2012). The log 
natural of total asset aims to eliminate scale effects (Baker & Hall, 1998; Barontini & Bozzi, 2009 
Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2012). Previous literatures have documented that firm size was strongly related to 
less material error in corporate reporting less financial risk (Kinney & McDaniel, 1989), faster growth, and 
better internal control mechanisms (Doyle, Ge, & McVay, 2007). Nonetheless, finding of the current study 
is not consistent with previous studies associating total asset with investor such as firm valuation 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Anderson & Reeb, 2004), investor reaction (Kinney & McDaniel, 1989; 
Bamaber & Cheon, 1995; El-Gazzar, 1998). Regarding that matter, the following hypothesis 5 is 
proposed: 
 
H5: Information about the total revenue is related to investor confidence 
 
 In addition, total revenue is other proxy of firm size representing the capability of a company to 
generate sales revenue. The level of sales was commonly associated with the level of investor 
confidence. Greater sales was regarded as a reflection of higher effective monitoring of Boards of 
directors toward corporate management (John & Senbet, 1997), higher effort in creating greater 
prospects for future opportunities, and higher effort in restricting expropriation minority shareholders 
(Nworji, Adebayo, & David, 2011), which in turn to affect positively significant toward corporate value 
(Mak & Kusnadi, 2005). These findings implied that investors provide positive valuation on the level of 
sales generated by companies in assessing corporate performance. Therefore, it can be expected that 
total revenue can be used as a variable control of the attributes of effective management and effective 
monitoring in relation to the level of investor confidence as explained in John and Senbet (1997); Zhu, 
Tian, and Ma (2009); Bhana (2010); and Nworji et al. (2011). 
Moreover, Ertimur, Livnat, and Martikainen (2003) have documented that positive sales surprises was 
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related significantly to positive market reaction and it became stronger when it was compared to the 
market reaction on cost saving surprises. Information disclosure about total revenue could also be 
interpreted as a reflection of higher monitoring of board of directors to induce corporate management to 
enhance corporate disclosure (Lang & Lundholm, 1993). In fact, preliminary evidence indicates that total 
revenue is a determinant of sustainability of companies (Constantinou & Constantinou, 2003; Cosh, 
Hughes, Lee & Singh as cited in Constantinou & Constantinou, 2003). 




















 Based on the discussion explained above, a conceptual framework for investors' confidence was 
proposed as presented in Figure 1. It represented the relationship between internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm size  toward investors' confidence. The conceptual framework focused on two 
independent factors represented by internal corporate governance mechanism and firm size and one 
dependent variable represented by investors' confidence. The factor of internal corporate governance 
mechanism were represented by four variables namely Board Process, Board Structure, Board 
Composition, and Board Characteristics, while the factor of firm size was represented by total asset and 
total revenue. To measure the dependent variable, the returns’ skewness was used as a proxy of 
investors' confidence. Therefore, there were six hypotheses that were proposed. The supporting theory 
used to account for the conceptual framework illustrated in Figure 1 was agency theory. 
 
Agency theory refers to a set of concepts indicating agency relationship between principal and 
agent who are engaged in cooperative behavior under a set of contracts (Eisenhardt, 1989). The principal 
(i.e., investors) ideally would achieve optimal level of confidence in the relationship if an agent (i.e., 
corporate management) acting in line with goals and behalf of principal (Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2001), 
In fact, the agency relationship faces agency problem when there are different goals between principal 
and agent.  They  tend  to enhance  their own  interests by decisions  that are  suboptimal  to other party 
(Fama  &  Jensen,  1983).  Hence,  the  principal  commonly  feels  fear  (less  confidence)  in  agent’s  acts 
(Institute of Chartered Accountants, 2005).  
Control mechanism  is  one  of  the  solutions  to  reduce  conflict  of  interest  (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).  Strategies  to  build  control  mechanisms  can  be  divided  into  two  broad  categories.  The  first 




This  study  focused  on  the  second  category  of  control mechanism.  The main  reason  for  using  control 
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investors  in  the  fiduciary  role of Boards of Director  to  satisfy  investors’  interest. Hence,  if  companies 
disclose information about firm size as a representation of firm size represented by total asset and total 








This study uses 227 sample companies out of 260 companies listed on the list of Sharia Securities 
(DES) in Indonesia in 2011. The determination of the sample size was based on data availability in 




 Data on internal corporate governance mechanisms were hand-collected from annual reports 
published on IDX website (www.idx.co.id). Meanwhile, data on investor confidence were collected 




Firm size was represented by total asset and total revenue measured by log of total asset (TA) and log 
of total Sales (TR). Meanwhile, the measure of investor confidence is the coefficient of conditional 
skewness (SKEW) referring to Bae, Lim, and Wei (2006). The formula of coefficient of SKEW is as 
follows: 
                                                                
  (1)  
Where: 
 
Rit  = daily returns represents daily returns of stock I during period t n = the 
number of observations on daily returns during the period. 
 
This measure indicated a change in returns related to a stock that has larger positive (negative) 
value in the skew of the return distribution. The coefficient of SKEW reflects investor preference towards 
the change of payoffs in the individual stock itself. (Bae, Lim, and Wei, 2006). Hence, the coefficient of 
SKEW captures investor confidence in holding stock. 
The internal corporate governance mechanism was measured by four proxies. The four themes were 
built by referring to Board’s performance attributes categorized by Zahra and Pearce (1989). Meanwhile, 
items of each themes as well as coding for each item refer to parts of items used by Dey (2005) 
extended by parts of items referring to Zahra and Pearce (1989). The Table 1 showed the measure of 
each proxy representing internal corporate governance mechanism.  
 
Table 1: The   Measure   of   Each   Proxy   of   Internal   Corporate   Governance Mechanisms 
 
Proxy Measure  
The level of Board Process              =  Total score of the attributes of Board Process 
The level of Board Structure             =   Total number of the attributes of Board Structure 
The level of Board Composition       = Total number of the attributes of Board Composition 
The level of Board  Characteristics   = Total number of the attributes of Board Characteristics 
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 The relationship between four attributes of internal corporate governance mechanisms and 
investor confidence is examined by using regression analysis for the following model. 
 




The result of the regression analysis supports the hypothesis one to four that Board  Process  (t=-
14.176  at  p<0.01), Board Structure  (t=10.516  with p<0.01), Board Composition (t=10.622 with p<0.01), 
and Board Characteristics (t=-1.804 with p<0.1) are significantly related to investors’ confidence. Firm 
size represented by total asset (t=1.884 with p<0.1) is also associated with investors’ confidence 
significantly while total revenue (t=-1.280 with p >0.1) shows no significant effect on investors’ 
confidence. The model showed F change of 61.347 in which significant at p<0.01 with adjusted R2  
of 61.6  percent.  Although  most  of  the  hypotheses  are  supported  by  significant evidence of 
regression analysis, the sign of effect is different among the variables. Board Composition and Board 
Structure showed a positive effect on investors’ confidence. This result denoted that investors are more 
confident in a company with higher scores of Board Composition and Board Structure. 
 On  the  contrary,  Board  Process  and  Board  Characteristics  show  an opposite  direction  (a  
significant  negative  effect)  on  investors’  confidence.  It means that investors are less confident in a 
company with higher score of Board Process as well as the level of Board Characteristic. 
 






95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Lower Upper 
(Constant) 47.586 226  .0000 .898 .975 .99878 .060122 
TA 1.884 226  .0609 .000 .016 6.02813 .851970 
TR -1.280 226  .2018 -.009 .002 5.68308 1.270272 
BP -14.176 226  .0000 -.019 -.014 11.7600 3.115000 
BS 10.516 226  .0000 .006 .008 17.4700 5.273000 
BC 10.622 226  .0000 .015 .021 6.8900 1.641000 
BCh -1.804 226  .0726 -.003 .000 11.5500 3.260000 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
The effect of firm size shows significant positive effect on investor confidence represented by total asset 
while total revenue as a representation of firm size does not show significant effect on investor 
confidence. The finding show that total asset is considered by investors in their decision making process. 
This support several previous studies showing that total asset was related significantly with investors’ 
valuation (anderson & reeb, 2003; anderson & reeb, 2004) and investors’ reaction (kinney & mcdaniel, 
1989; bamaber & cheon, 1995; el-gazzar, 1998). Meanwhile, total revenue shows weak effect on 
investors’ confidence. This finding does not support previous studies showing that the total revenue had 
significant effect on investors’ reaction (ertimur, livnat, and martikainen, 2003) and investors’ confidence 
(john and senbet, 1997); zhu, tian, and ma, 2009); bhana, 2010); and nworji et al., 2011). Total sales 
probably is not considered by investors in decision making process, because total sales is not a proper 
reflection of the capability of a company to enhance investors’ wealth. To determine whether a company 
can enhance investors’ wealth, the investors should know how efficient a company manage its operation. 
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In addition, it is hard to interpret that information about total revenue is a reflection of effective 
management and supervising the activities of a company.     
 Moreover, board process and board composition show negative significant effect on investors’ 
confidence. The possible reasons for the negative relationship between Board Process and investor 
confidence are that investors may attribute higher score of Board Process as excessive, inefficient and 
costly actions as found by Danoshana and Ravivathani (2013). They found that Board Process 
represented by Board meeting frequency increased management costs. The second possible reason is 
that investors may attribute higher score of Board Process as a cover for satisfying regulations and 
avoiding shareholder litigation as argued by Brick and Chidambaran (2010). The third possible reason is 
that investors may attribute higher score of Board Process as an indication that a company has some 
problems and challenges causing an increase of Boards’ activity (Jay and MacIver, 1989). Additionally, 
Lasfer (2007) found that Board Process represented by Board meeting frequency increased when 
companies faced financial distress. 
 In addition, negative relationship between Board Characteristic and investor confidence implied 
that investors are less confident when Sharia-compliant companies present higher score of Board 
Characteristics. This finding is contrary to the number of studies suggesting positive relationship between 
the components of Board Characteristics and investor behavior, such as Tehranian and Waegelein 
(1985), Rivas et al. (2009) and Francis et al. (2012) and firm performance (Francis et al., 2012). 
The result of this study is consistent with several previous kinds of literature. For example, 
Wiersema and Bantel (1992) found that Board age as a proxy of Board Characteristic was negatively 
linked to the propensity to change corporate strategy, and Nakano and Nguyen (2011) highlighted that 
Board Characteristic (represented by Board age) was  negatively related to corporate growth, 
variability of operating profits and chance to conduct acquisitions. Additionally, Core, Holthausen, & 
Larcker (1999) noted a negative link between Board age and capital market behavior. 
From this, it appears that investors may perceive that the higher scores of the quality of Board 
Characteristic, the less confidence of investors in the effectiveness of Boards to undertake their tasks in 
line with investors’ interests. When we look at each item of Board Characteristic, it can be assumed 
that there are several reasons underlying the negative effect. 
Firstly, investors may regard older Board members are more concerned with their career as they 
near retirement. Hence, Boards with older members may make an excessive commitment to maintaining 
their positions rather than attempting to reduce agency conflict. 
Secondly, Barontini and Bozzi (2009) found that managers’ excessive compensation was never 
related to firms’ future performance, especially for companies with founding families. Dah (2012) also 
confirmed that high directors’ compensation reduced the likelihood of CEO turnover, mitigated the 
turnover- performance sensitivity, and encouraged managerial entrenchment. The evidence may   lead   
investors   to   perceive   that   higher   compensation   for   corporate management means a higher 
likelihood of manager entrenchment and controlling power of founding families or managers that can 
increase their focus on self- interest rather than minority shareholders. As such, Core et al. (1999) found 
that firms with agency problems tended to provide higher CEO compensation. This is consistent with the 
finding of this study, which showed a negative relationship between Board Characteristic and investor 
confidence. 
Thirdly, another explanation for the negative effect of Board Characteristic on investor confidence 
is that investors may attribute Board ownership and multiple directorships as a reflection of less 
independence of Board members in undertaking their responsibilities. Ferris et al. (2003) argued that 
Boards with high share ownership be more likely to prioritize management and major shareholder 
interests.  Additionally,  an  earlier  study  of  multiple  directorship/experience showed that multiple 
directorships were a detriment to corporate governance (Richardson, 1987). Investors may perceive that 
multiple directorships reflect a tendency to have substantial external commitments and encourage 
collusion 
Furthermore, busy commissioners may not have enough time to fulfill their responsibilities, 
leading to ineffective monitors of corporate management and firm performance (Fich & Shivdasani, 
2006). Given the negative effect of the attributes of Board Process and Board Characteristics, 
disclosing attributes  of Board Process and Board Characteristics should be addressed carefully, 
because investors do not always show positive respond to the corporate bonding effort in disclosing 
attributes of internal corporate governance mechanism. It should be undertaken deep analysis to know 
what attributes of internal corporate governance mechanism  that  actually  investors  need  for  
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